We extend the notion of verifiable random functions (VRF) to constrained VRFs, which generalize the concept of constrained pseudorandom functions, put forward by Boneh and Waters (Asiacrypt'13), and independently by Kiayias et al. (CCS'13) and Boyle et al. (PKC'14), who call them delegatable PRFs and functional PRFs, respectively. In a standard VRF the secret key sk allows one to evaluate a pseudorandom function at any point of its domain; in addition, it enables computation of a non-interactive proof that the function value was computed correctly. In a constrained VRF from the key sk one can derive constrained keys sk S for subsets S of the domain, which allow computation of function values and proofs only at points in S.
Introduction
Verifiable random functions. A pseudorandom function (PRF) [GGM86] is an efficiently computable keyed function F : K × X → Y for which, when the seed k is chosen at random, no efficient attacker should be able to distinguish F (k, x) from a random value, even when given oracle access to F (k, ·) at any other point. This fundamental primitive in cryptography was extended to verifiable random functions (VRF) by Micali, Rabin and Vadhan [MRV99] . In a VRF a secret key sk, which is set up together with a public key pk, allows evaluation of F and furthermore computation of a non-interactive proof that the computed value y matches F (sk, x). Verification of the proof must be done with respect to the public key pk only; in particular, we cannot make use of a common reference string (CRS). The proofs should remain sound even when pk was computed maliciously and F (sk, x) should remain pseudorandom even when an adversary can query values of F and proofs for them at any other point.
The first VRF schemes were based on bilinear maps, such as [Lys02, Dod03, DY05] . Efficient schemes have proved difficult to construct, in particular ones with large domains based on noninteractive assumptions, and were only proposed from 2010 on [HW10, BMR10, ACF13] . VRFs have turned out to be a useful building block, e.g. in the construction of zero-knowledge proofs and databases [MR01, Lis05] and electronic payment schemes [MR02, BCKL09] , to name a few.
Constrained VRFs. Boneh and Waters [BW13] define a new notion of PRFs, which they call constrained PRFs and which was concurrently introduced as delegatable PRFs by Kiayias, Papadopoulos, Triandopoulos and Zacharias [KPTZ13] , and as functional PRFs by Boyle, Goldwasser and Ivan [BGI14] . While a key k for a PRF enables evaluation of the function F at all points of its domain X , a constrained PRF allows one to derive constrained keys from k. A constrained key k S corresponds to a set S ⊆ X and allows computation of F (k, x) only for x ∈ S.
Pseudorandomness requires that given an oracle for function values at points of the adversary's choice and an oracle for constrained keys for sets of its choice, values of F (k, ·) at points outside the queried sets and different from the queried points should still be indistinguishable from random. That is, after querying keys for S 1 , . . . , S q and functions values at x 1 , . . . , x p , the value F (k, x) should be indistinguishable from random for all x / ∈ q i=1 S i ∪ {x 1 , . . . , x p }. Constrained PRFs were used to construct broadcast encryption and identity-based non-interactive key exchange in [BW13] . In particular punctured PRFs have proved to be a powerful tool in combination with indistinguishability obfuscation [GGH + 13b] , leading to solutions of longstanding open problems, such as deniable encryption [CDNO97] in [SW13] and instantiating full-domain hash [BR93] in [HSW13b] .
We unify VRFs and constrained PRFs by adding the possibility to derive constrained keys to the notion of VRFs. We then construct constrained VRF schemes based on the Boneh-Waters constrained PRFs which are defined using multilinear maps [BS02, GGH13a, CLT13] . Our second scheme allows derivation of constrained keys for any subset of the domain that can be decided by a boolean circuit of polynomial size.
Verifiable random functions turned out a lot harder to construct than PRFs. While the DodisYampolskiy VRF [DY05] only supports domains of polynomial size, it requires a q-type assumption (where the parameter q of the assumption upper-bounds how many queries an adversary can make). Hohenberger and Waters [HW10] proposed the first VRF for large domains, whose function values are defined analogously to those of the PRF by Naor and Reingold [NR97] , but lifted to the target group of a bilinear map. These maps are then used to verify the proofs of correct function evaluation. Hohenberger and Waters prove their construction secure under a non-standard q-type assumption, while the Naor-Reingold PRF is proved secure under the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption.
Using multilinear maps, the situation is different: Our VRF constructions support large input spaces when using complexity leveraging (see below), and we prove their security under the same assumption on which pseudorandomness of the Boneh-Waters constrained PRFs rely: the DDH assumption adapted to the multilinear-map environment. We moreover show that we do not need to lift the function values "up one level": our VRF values are defined exactly as the Boneh-Waters PRF values. We thus show how to add verifiability to the constrained PRFs from [BW13] without changing the PRF itself, nor using a different assumption to prove pseudorandomness.
Our contribution. We first formalize the notion of constrained VRFs by extending the model for standard VRFs. In addition to Setup, Prove and Verify, we define an algorithm Constrain, which allows to derive constrained keys. We adapt the security notions of provability, uniqueness and pseudorandomness to the constrained setting and define a new security notion. It requires that a proof produced by a constrained key should be distributed like proofs computed using the actual secret key. A constrained key sk S behaves thus exactly like the key sk on the subset S of the domain.
We present two multilinear-maps-based instantiations of constrained VRFs with input space X := {0, 1} n for different systems of sets for which constrained keys can be derived:
• Bit-fixing VRF: Constrained keys can be derived for any set S v ⊆ {0, 1} n , described by a vector v ∈ {0, 1, ?} as the set of all strings which match v at all coordinates that are not '?'.
• Circuit-constrained VRF: In our second construction keys can be derived for any set that is decidable by a polynomial-size circuit C. More precisely, a key sk C , derived from sk for a circuit C, enables computation of F (sk, x) and a proof for all x for which C(x) = 1.
Both our schemes are directly derived from the constructions of constrained PRFs given by Boneh and Waters [BW13] . These are defined over a leveled multilinear group, which is a sequence of groups G 1 , . . . , G κ , each G i of prime order p > 2 λ and generated by g i , equipped with bilinear maps ("pairings") e i,j :
The bit-fixing PRF from [BW13] maps inputs from {0, 1} n to an element of G κ where κ = n + 1. A key is a tuple k = (α,
p and the PRF is defined as
As noted in [BW13] , the values D i,j := g
could be made public, and inspection of the proof reveals that A := g α 2 could also be made public without affecting pseudorandomness. These values could be used to make the PRF output P publicly verifiable if we added one level in the group sequence, that is, set κ := n + 2. Then in order to verify that some P ∈ G n+1 equals P (sk, x) as defined in (1), one could repeatedly apply the pairings to A and D 1,x 1 , . . . , D n,xn to compute (g n+2 )
and check whether this equals the pairing of P with g 1 , which would lift P to G n+2 .
Of course this shows that P (sk, x) is not pseudorandom anymore after adding a level in the group hierarchy; however, it can serve as the proof for a related value in G κ . After adding an element γ ∈ Z p to the secret key, we define the VRF value as F (sk,
can now be used to check whether some y ∈ G κ equals F (sk, x): we add C := g γ 1 to the public key and then have e 1,κ−1 (C, P (sk,
A nice side effect of this approach is that since our proof corresponds to the PRF value in [BW13] , we can reuse their constrained keys to construct proofs. In particular for the circuit-constrained VRF this involves sophisticated techniques derived from [GGH + 13c] .
While this approach works for both the bit-fixing VRF and the circuit-constrained VRF, a drawback is that it requires an extra level in the group hierarchy. Somewhat surprisingly, we show that this is not necessary: we instantiate circuit-constrained VRFs using the same number of group levels as the Boneh-Waters circuit-constrained PRF and for the bit-fixing construction we even require one level less than [BW13] .
The reason for this is that, as we show, the bit-fixing PRF can be constructed over a multilinear group with κ = n − 1 (rather than κ = n + 1 in [BW13] ) and the circuit-constrained PRF can be constructed for κ = n + − 1 (rather than κ = n + in [BW13] ), where is the maximum depth of the circuits. This allows us to use the freed level for verification and preserve the function value of the PRF. We present these modified constrained PRFs and prove their security in Appendix A.
In Appendix B we show that, as for the constrained PRFs in [BW13] , our constructions can be transferred from leveled multilinear groups to graded encodings, constructed by Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13a] , which can be viewed as "approximate" multilinear groups.
Complexity leveraging. Pseudorandomness of our VRFs can be reduced to the multilinear DDH assumption without any security loss when considering selective security. For this notion the adversary must decide on which value it wants to be challenged before receiving the public key. Adaptive security (where the adversary can make its challenge query at any point) can then be obtained generically via complexity leveraging [BB04a] : the reduction simply guesses beforehand which challenge value the adversary will query. This leads to a security loss that is exponential in the input length, which must be compensated by increasing the parameters of the scheme.
Together with Konstantinov, Pietrzak and Rao [FKPR14] , we recently showed that any simple reduction (that is, one which runs an adversary once without rewinding) from pseudorandomness of the Boneh-Waters constrained PRF to a non-interactive hardness assumption must incur a security loss that is exponential in the input length. Since constrained VRFs imply constrained PRFs, this also holds for our construction, meaning that our proofs using complexity leveraging are in some sense optimal.
Related work. VRFs have been constructed in bilinear groups by Lysyanskaya [Lys02] and Dodis [Dod03] . Based on Boneh-Boyen signatures [BB04b] , Dodis and Yampolskiy [DY05] gave the first efficient scheme that is secure under a non-interactive assumption, but for small input spaces only. Hohenberger and Waters [HW10] proposed the first VRF for exponential-size domains without resorting to complexity leveraging or interactive assumptions. Boneh, Montgomery and Raghunathan [BMR10] achieve a similar result basing their construction on the Dodis-Yampolskiy VRF. Abdalla, Catalano and Fiore [ACF13] show connections of VRFs to identity-based key encapsulation, and also present a VRF with large input spaces. Evidence why VRFs are hard to construct is given by Brakerski, Goldwasser, Rothblum and Vaikuntanathan [BGRV09] , who show that there is no black-box construction from one-way permutations, and Fiore and Schröder [FS12] , showing that there is also none from trapdoor permutations. Variants of VRFs include simulatable VRFs [CL07] (where CRSs are allowed) and weak VRFs [BGRV09] .
The concept of restricting keys for PRFs to subsets of their domains was concurrently introduced as constrained PRFs by Boneh and Waters [BW13] , as delegatable PRFs by Kiayias et al. [KPTZ13] , and as functional PRFs by Boyle et al. [BGI14] . The latter mention functional VRFs as an open problem.
An analogous notion for digital signatures, namely deriving signing keys that can only sign subsets of the message space was concurrently introduced by Boyle et al. [BGI14] as functional signatures and by Bellare and the author as policy-based signatures [BF14] . Since VRFs satisfy the definition of digital signatures, constrained VRFs immediately yield policy-based signatures (PBS) for the same classes of policies describing the constrained input (message) space. We note however that constrainthiding constrained VRFs, which we construct in this paper, cannot satisfy the stronger of the two security definitions for PBS proposed in [BF14] , which requires that the policy (constraint) can be extracted from a signature.
Preliminaries
Notation. If S is a finite set then |S| denotes its size and s ←$ S denotes picking an element uniformly from S and assigning it to s. For n ∈ N we let [n] = {1, . . . , n}. We denote the security parameter by λ ∈ N and its unary representation by 1 λ . Algorithms are randomized unless otherwise indicated and "PT" stands for "polynomial-time" for both randomized and deterministic algorithms. We denote by y := A(x 1 , . . . ; ρ) the operation of running algorithm A on inputs x 1 , . . . and coins ρ and assigning the output to y. By y ←$ A(x 1 , . . .), we denote letting y := A(x 1 , . . . ; ρ) with ρ chosen at random. We denote by [A(x 1 , . . .)] the set of points that have positive probability of being output by A on inputs x 1 , . . . .
Multilinear groups.
The usefulness of groups with multilinear maps in which computing discrete logarithms is hard was first observed by Boneh and Silverberg [BS02] . It was only recently that candidates for leveled multilinear forms were proposed by Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13a] and then by Coron, Lepoint and Tibouchi [CLT13] . Although these constructions implement graded encodings, which differ from multilinear groups, we present our results in the language of multilinear groups. These can then be transferred in a straightforward manner to graded encodings, as we show in Appendix B.
Leveled multilinear groups are generated by a group generator G, which takes as input the security parameter 1 λ and κ ∈ N, which determines the number of levels. G(1 λ , κ) outputs a sequence of groups G = (G 1 , . . . , G κ ) of prime order p > 2 λ . We assume that the description of each group contains a canonical generator g i . For all i, j ≥ 1 with i + j ≤ κ, there exists a bilinear map e i,j :
(We omit the indices i, j of the maps if they can be deduced from the context.)
The only hardness assumption we will make is the following:
Circuits. Our treatment of circuits follows that by Boneh and Waters [BW13] , who adapt the model of Bellare et al. [BHR12] . They consider boolean circuits with a single output gate and require that circuits are layered (where a gate at level j receives its inputs from wires at level j − 1) and monotonic in that they only contain AND and OR gates. This is without loss of generality, since an arbitrary circuit can be transformed into a layered monotonic circuit of polynomially related size. Definition 1. A circuit is a 5-tuple f = (n, q, A, B, GateType), where n is the number of inputs and q is the number of gates. Wires are associated with the set [n + q] = {1, . . . , n + q}, where {1, . . . , n} are the input wires and n + q is the output wire. Gates are labeled by the same index as their outgoing wire, we thus define Gates := {n + 1, . . . , n + q}.
The function A : Gates → [n + q] maps a gate w to its first incoming wire A(w) and B : Gates → [n + q] maps a gate w to its second incoming wire B(w). We require w > B(w) > A(w). The function GateType : Gates → {AND, OR} specifies whether a gate is an AND or an OR gate.
The function depth(w) maps a wire to the length of the shortest path to an input wire plus 1; in particular for w ∈ [n] we have depth(w) = 1. Moreover, a circuit is layered if for all w ∈ Gates : depth(A(w)) = depth(B(w)) = depth(w) − 1. We let f (x) denote the evaluation of the circuit f on input x ∈ {0, 1} n and let f w (x) denote the value of wire w of the circuit on input x.
Constrained Verifiable Random Functions
We extend the definition of constrained pseudorandom functions (PRF), defined by Boneh and Waters [BW13] to constrained verifiable random functions (VRF). A constrained PRF allows one to evaluate a keyed function F : K × X → Y and defines an algorithm that given a key k ∈ K and a set S ⊆ X derives a key k S with which one can only evaluate F on points x ∈ S. It is set up w.r.t. a set system S ⊆ 2 X , defining the sets for which constrained keys can be derived.
For VRFs, in addition to a (secret) key, the setup algorithm outputs a public key pk. Given a constrained secret key sk S derived from sk for a set S ∈ S and an input x ∈ S, the algorithm Prove computes the value y = F (sk, x) (like the algorithm eval in [BW13] ). It moreover outputs a proof π for the fact that F (sk, x) = y, which can be verified w.r.t. pk via an algorithm Verify.
We require that a constrained VRF satisfies the following properties: Provability ensures completeness of the scheme: running Prove on a constrained key outputs the correct function value and a proof that passes verification. Uniqueness guarantees soundness of the proofs: for any (possibly maliciously computed) value pk and every x ∈ X there exists at most one y ∈ Y for which Verify(pk, x, y, π) = 1 for some π. Compared to PRFs, pseudorandomness should also hold against adversaries that obtain the public key and proofs for input points in addition to function values and constrained keys of their choice.
Finally, we consider an additional privacy or anonymity notion, which ensures that proofs do not reveal anything about the constrained key used to compute them: proofs computed with a constrained key should be distributed like proofs computed with the actual secret key. Note that this notion would not be meaningful for constrained PRFs or (standard) VRFs: a constrained key for a PRF is only used to evaluate F , so by definition, different constrained keys yield the same output; and for standard VRFs all proofs are computed with the same key.
Definition. Let F : K × X → Y be a function computable in polynomial time, where K is the key space, X is the domain and Y the range (which may all be parametrized by the security parameter λ). F is said to be a constrained verifiable random function w.r.t. a set system S ⊆ 2 X if there exists a constrained-key space K , a proof space P and PT algorithms Setup, Constrain, Prove and Verify:
• Setup(1 λ ) outputs a pair of keys (pk, sk).
• Constrain(sk, S), on input a secret key and a set S ∈ S, outputs a constrained key sk S ∈ K .
• Prove(sk S , x) outputs a pair (y, π) ∈ Y ×P ∪ {(⊥, ⊥)} of a function value and a proof.
• Verify(pk, x, y, π) verifies that y = F (sk, x) using proof π, outputting a value in {0, 1}.
We require the following properties:
• If x ∈ S then y = F (sk, x) and Verify(pk, x, y, π) = 1
Uniqueness. For all λ ∈ N, all pk, all x ∈ X , y 0 , y 1 ∈ Y and π 0 , π 1 ∈ P one of the following holds:
• Verify(pk, x, y 0 , π 0 ) = 0, or
that is, for every x there is at most one value y for which there exists a proof that F (sk, x) = y.
Constraint-hiding. This notion ensures that the proof does not reveal which key was used to create it. We require that there exist a PT algorithm P :
and all x ∈ S the following holds: the second output, π, of Prove(sk S , x) and the output of P (sk, x) are distributed identically.
Pseudorandomness. Consider the following experiment Exp pr b (λ) for λ ∈ N and b ∈ {0, 1}: • Generate (pk, sk) ←$ Setup(1 λ ).
• Initialize sets C and V to ∅, where V will contain the points the adversary can evaluate and C records the points at which the adversary queried a challenge. Moreover, initialize an empty list R indexed by the set X , used to store random values.
• Run the adversary on pk and provide the following oracles:
Constrain: On input S ∈ S, if S ∩ C = ∅, return sk S ←$ Constrain(sk, S) and set V := V ∪ S; else return ⊥.
Prove: Given x ∈ X , if x / ∈ C, return F ((sk, x), P (sk, x)) and set V := V ∪ {x}; else return ⊥.
Challenge: On input x ∈ X , if x ∈ V then return ⊥. • Let b ∈ {0, 1} be the adversary's final output, which we define as the output of the experiment.
A constrained VRF is pseudorandom if the function Pr[Exp
Note that by the constraint-hiding property an oracle to obtain Prove evaluations under constrained keys unknown to the adversary would be redundant. In our security proofs we will only allow the adversary to query its challenge oracle once. This restricted notion however implies the notion defined above via a standard hybrid argument.
Bit-Fixing VRF
In our first construction constrained keys can be derived for any "bit-fixing" set. Such a set is defined by a value v ∈ {0, 1, ?} n as the set of all x ∈ {0, 1} n that match v at all positions where v is different from '?':
The set system for our constrained VRF is then defined as
We show how to add verifiability to the bit-fixing PRF by Boneh and Waters [BW13] , which has domain X = {0, 1} n and where keys can be derived for S v for every v ∈ {0, 1, ?} n . As discussed in the introduction, the idea is to use one extra level of the group hierarchy for verification: the element that was the PRF value now serves as proof and the VRF value will live one group level above. Verification is done using the pairings to check consistency. For their bit-fixing PRF, Boneh and Waters define
In Appendix A.1 we show that n−1 group levels suffice when one defines the PRF value as
We use this value as the proof in our VRF construction and the same constrained keys for both the modified PRF and the VRF. In order to provide verifiability, we add back one level; the last group in our hierarchy is thus G n , which is one level below the one of the Boneh-Waters PRF. 1
Construction
Setup(1 λ , 1 n ): On input the security parameter λ and the input length n, the setup runs G(1 λ , n) to compute a sequence of groups G = (G 1 , . . . , G n ) of prime order p, with generators g 1 , . . . , g n , of which we let g := g 1 . It chooses γ ←$ Z p and (
p uniformly at random and sets C := g γ and D i,β := g d i,β for i ∈ [n] and β ∈ {0, 1}. The VRF public and secret key are defined as
The domain is X = {0, 1} n , the range of the function is Y = G n and proofs are in G n−1 . The function value and the proof for input x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n are defined as
Verify(pk, x, y, π): To verify a tuple (x, y, π) ∈ {0, 1} n ×G n ×G n−1 w.r.t. public key pk = ( G, C,
by applying the bilinear maps to (D 1,x 1 , . . . , D n,xn ) and output 1 if the following equations are satisfied:
Note that from a proof P (sk, x), by pairing it with the public-key element C, one can compute F (sk, x) = e(C, P (sk, x)). It suffices thus that a constrained key lets us construct P (sk, x). The algorithm takes as input sk and a vector v ∈ {0, 1, ?} n describing the constrained domain
} be the set of indices for which the input bit is fixed to 0 or 1. Return sk v := (pk, k v ), with k v defined as follows:
(If V = ∅ then return sk, from which Prove(sk, x) simply computes F (sk, x) and P (sk, x).) ⊥) ; else apply the bilinear maps to {D i,x i } i∈V to compute
Finally, compute e C, P (sk, x) = e g γ ,
group levels, lift the domain of F from Gn to Gn+1, that of P from Gn−1 to Gn, and define the public-key element
The secret key element γ would then correspond to α in [BW13] .
Properties
Provability. When (pk = ( G, C, {D i,β }), sk) ←$ Setup(1 λ ) then from the definition of F and P it follows immediately that for all x ∈ {0, 1} n : e(g, P (sk,
We have thus Verify(pk, x, F (sk, x), P (sk, x)) = 1.
Moreover, given a constrained key sk v derived for a vector v ∈ {0, 1, ?} n and x ∈ {0, 1} n with x i = v i or v i = ? for all i, it follows by inspection that Prove(sk v , x) computes (F (sk, x), P (sk, x)), which we showed satisfy the verification equations.
Uniqueness. Consider a public key pk = ( G,
Constraint-hiding. The proof algorithm P maps sk = (γ, {d i,β } i∈[n], β∈{0,1} ) and x ∈ {0, 1} n to
Since by provability, this is precisely the value that Prove(sk v , x) outputs for any constraint v and any x satisfying v, the constraint-hiding property follows immediately.
Proof of Pseudorandomness
Theorem 1. If there exists a PT adversary A that makes one challenge query and breaks pseudorandomness of the above n-bit-input bit-fixing VRF with advantage (λ) then there exists a PT algorithm B that breaks the n-Multilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption with advantage 2 −n · (λ).
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that when x * is A's challenge query then A never queries constrained keys that could evaluate x * , nor its Prove oracle on x * . We construct B, which receives an n-MDDH challenge consisting of a group-sequence description G and elements g = g 1 , g c 1 , . . . , g c n+1 and T , which is either g n i∈[n+1] c j or a random element from G n . B picks a random value x * ←$ {0, 1} n , which it hopes will be A's challenge query, and z 1 , . . . , z n ←$ Z p and sets
It also defines γ := c n+1 by setting C := g c n+1 . B then runs A on input the public key ( G, C, {D i,β } i∈[n], β∈{0,1} ), which is distributed as in the real scheme.
Constrain queries. Suppose A queries a secret key for v ∈ {0, 1, ?} n . Let V := {i ∈ [n] | v i = ?} be the set of indices that v fixes. B selects j ∈ V such that v j = x * j . If no such j exists then the key could be used to evaluate F (sk, x * ), meaning B's guess was wrong, as we assumed A would not make such a query. In this case B aborts outputting a random guess b ←$ {0, 1}. Prove queries. Since P (sk, x) is identical to a key for v = x, this value can be computed as for the constrained-key query above. F (sk, x) is computed by pairing it with C.
Challenge query. If A's challenge query is different from x * then B aborts outputting a random guess b ←$ {0, 1}. Otherwise, it outputs T as a response to the query. If 
which shows that B's advantage in breaking n-MDDH is (λ) = 2 −n · (λ).
Circuit-Constrained VRF
Consider a polynomial-size circuit f as in Definition 1. Our second VRF construction allows us to derive a constrained key sk f enabling function evaluations and proof computations for exactly those values x, for which f (x) = 1. Letting C be the set of all polynomial-size circuits, we have
Our circuit-constrained VRF is derived from the Boneh-Waters PRF [BW13] for the same set system. Their PRF values are in G κ with κ = n + , where is the maximum depth of the supported circuits. In Appendix A.2 we show that their PRF construction can be modified and defined over a group sequence with κ = n + − 1, by shifting the PRF value and elements of the constrained key down by one level. Pseudorandomness then follows from (n + − 1)-MDDH.
For our constrained VRF we define the proofs as the values of the modified PRF in G n+ −1 (so proofs can be constructed using the constrained keys of the modified PRF), then add back one level in the group hierarchy and define the function values in G n+ as pairings of the proof with an additional public-key element g γ . The Boneh-Waters PRF is defined as 
Construction
Setup(1 λ , 1 n , 1 ): On input the security parameter λ, the bit length n and the maximum depth of the circuits, Setup does the following: Run G(1 λ , κ) with κ := n + to obtain a sequence of groups G = (G 1 , . . . , G κ ) of prime order p, with generators g = g 1 , . . . , g κ . Choose secret-key values α, γ ←$ Z p and (d 1,0 , d 1,1 ), . . . , (d n,0 , d n,1 ) ←$ Z 2 p and set A := g α , C := g γ and D i,β := g d i,β for i ∈ [n] and β ∈ {0, 1}. The VRF public key pk is defined as the group sequence G and A, C, {D i,β } i∈[n], β∈{0,1} . The secret key sk consists of the public key as well as α, γ, {d i,β } i∈[n], β∈{0,1} .
We define the domain as X := {0, 1} n , the range as Y := G κ , and the proof space as P := G κ−1 . On input x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X , the function value and the proof are defined as
Verify(pk, x, y, π): Given a public key pk = ( G, A, C, {D i,β } i,β ) and (x, y, π) ∈ {0, e(C, π) = y Constrain(sk, f = (n, q, A, B, GateType)): On input the secret key and a circuit description f , with n input wires, q gates (labeled from n + 1 to n + q), and the wire n + q designated as output wire, the constrain algorithm does the following: Choose r 1 , . . . , r n+q−1 ←$ Z p and set r n+q := α. For every wire w generate a key component K w , whose structure depends on the type of the wire: input wire, OR gate, or AND gate.
Input wire: If w ∈ [n], it corresponds to the w-th input and the key component is
OR gate: If w ∈ Gates with GateType(w) = OR and depth(w) = j then choose a w , b w ←$ Z p and compute the following key components: AND gate: If w ∈ Gates with GateType(w) = AND and depth(w) = j then choose a w , b w ←$ Z p and compute the following key components:
The constrained key sk f consists of these components for all n + q wires together with the circuit description f and the public key pk.
Prove(sk f , x): Given a constrained key sk f for circuit f = (n, q, A, B, GateType) and input x ∈ {0, 1} n , if f (x) = 0 , return (⊥, ⊥). Otherwise, evaluate the circuit level by level starting from the input wires. For every wire w that evaluates to 1, compute the value P w = (g n+j−1 ) rw i∈[n] d i,x i , where j = depth(w). Note that since r n+q = α, we have P n+q = P (sk, x), from which we can then compute F (sk, x) by pairing it with C. For every wire we distinguish the following cases:
Input wire: For w ∈ [n] we only consider those w for which x w = f w (x) = 1. Repeatedly apply the bilinear maps to the values {D i,x i } i =w to compute (g n−1 ) i∈[n]\{w} d i,x i and pair it with K w = g rw·d w,1 to obtain
OR gate: Let w ∈ Gates be such that f w (x) = 1 and GateType(w) = OR and let j = depth(w).
If f A(w) (x) = 1 then compute:
Otherwise, we must have f B(w) (x) = 1, so compute:
AND gate: Let w ∈ Gates be such that f w (x) = 1, GateType(w) = AND and depth(w) = j. We have f A(w) = f B(w) = 1 and with D(x) as above we compute:
Evaluating level by level all wires w for which f w (x) = 1, we arrive at P n+q = (g n+ −1 )
, from which we compute
and output F (sk, x), P (sk, x) .
Properties
Provability. When pk = ( G, A, C, {D i,β }), sk ←$ Setup(1 λ , 1 n , 1 ) then from the definition of F and P it follows that for all x ∈ {0, 1} n : e g, P (sk, x) = e A, D(x) and e C, P (sk, x) = F (sk, x). Moreover, given a constrained key sk f derived from sk for a depth-circuit f and x ∈ {0, 1} n with f (x) = 1, we see that when running the Prove algorithm, the value computed for every depth-j gate w for which f w (x) = 1 is P w = (g n+j−1 ) rw i∈[n] d i,x i . Since the value r n+q for the output gate was set as r n+q := α, Prove outputs (g n+ −1 ) α i∈[n] d i,x i = P (sk, x) and e C, P (sk, x) = F (sk, x), which are the values that satisfy verification.
Uniqueness. Consider a public key pk, consisting of G = (G 1 , . . . , G n+ ), A ∈ G , C ∈ G 1 and {D i,β } i∈[n], β∈{0,1} ∈ G 2n 1 , a value x ∈ {0, 1} n and values (y 0 , π 0 ), (y 1 , π 1 ) ∈ G n+ × G n+ −1 that satisfy Verify(pk, x, y β , π β ) = 1, for β ∈ {0, 1}. It suffices to show that
The second verification equation is y = e(C, π). Since e(C, π) = e g γ , (g n+ −1 ) α i∈[n] d i,x i , the only satisfying value for y is y = (g n+ ) α·γ i∈[n] d i,x i ; thus y 0 = y 1 = y, which proves uniqueness.
Constraint-hiding. The proof algorithm P maps sk = α, γ, {d i,β } i∈[n], β∈{0,1} ∈ Z 2n+2 p and x ∈ {0, 1} n to P (sk,
Since by provability, this is precisely the value that Prove(sk f , x) outputs for any x ∈ {0, 1} n and any key sk f ∈ [Constrain(sk, f )] for any -level circuit f with f (x) = 1, the constraint-hiding property follows immediately.
Proof of Pseudorandomness
Theorem 2. If there exists a PT adversary A that makes one challenge query and breaks pseudorandomness of the above n-bit depth-circuit-constrained VRF with advantage (λ) then there exists a PT algorithm B that breaks the (n + )-Multilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption with advantage 2 −n · (λ).
Proof. The proof follows that of [BW13] closely. Consider a PT algorithm A that wins the pseudorandomness game with advantage (λ). Without loss of generality, we assume that A never queries a key for a circuit f with f (x * ) = 1 and never queries its Prove oracle on x * (where x * is the value queried to Challenge). We construct an algorithm B that uses A to break (n + )-MDDH.
Setup. B receives a challenge consisting of a group sequence G and values g = g 1 , g c 1 , . . . , g c n+ +1
and T , where T is either (g n+ ) i∈[n+ +1] c i or a random group element in G n+ . Using the challenge, B sets up the keys as follows. It chooses x * ←$ {0, 1} n and z 1 , . . . , z n ←$ Z p and sets
Repeatedly applying the bilinear maps, it computes A := g c n+1 ···c n+ and sets C := g c n+ +1 . Note
, as well as α = c n+1 · · · c n+ and γ = c n+ +1 , which is distributed as in the real scheme. The parameters are set up so that we have
Constrain queries. Suppose A queries a private key for a circuit f . If f (x * ) = 1 then B aborts and outputs a guess b ← {0, 1}. Otherwise, it must compute the key component K w for every wire w of f . The simulation follows [BW13] , who base their technique on [GGH + 13c] .
For the final gate w = n+q we have r w = α and elements of K n+q contain (g −1 ) α = (g −1 ) c n+1 ···c n+ , which B cannot compute. Simulating this is thus the tricky part and is done as follows. In order to compute e.g. K n+q,4 = (g −1 )
α−b n+q ·r B(n+q) (if the last gate is an OR gate), B sets b n+q := c n+ and r B(n+q) := c n+1 · · · c n+ −1 (and adds some known randomness to each), so α cancels out and B can compute K n+q . Now r B(n+q) in level − 1 contains c n+1 · · · c n+ −1 , which has one fewer challenge value. Applying the trick again, B chooses the randomness of B(n + q)'s parent gates in level − 2 as c n+1 · · · c n+ −2 , and so on.
Note that since f n+q (x * ) = f (x * ) = 0, if gate n+q is an OR gate then both its parents must satisfy f A(n+q) (x * ) = f B(n+q) (x * ) = 0 and we need to embed challenge elements in both r B(n+q) and r A(n+q) to simulate K n+q . On the other hand, for an AND gate w with f w (x * ) = 0, only one of its parent gates must evaluate x * to 0, and for the cancellation trick to work, it suffices to embed c n+1 · · · c n+depth(w)−1 in the randomness of that parent. For every gate w at level j for which f w (x * ) = 0, we thus set r w := c n+1 · · · c n+j (plus some η w ←$ Z p to make r w uniform). For the input wires we have r w := c n+1 + η w , for which we can simulate K w = g rw·d w,1 , since d w,1 = z w when f w (x * ) = x * w = 0. Note that this does not work for wires and gates w with f w (x * ) = 1, for which it however suffices to compute the key elements K w honestly.
Formalizing the above, B answers a Constrain query for f = (n, q, A, B, GateType) by computing K w for every gate starting from the input wires:
Input wire: Suppose w ∈ [n]. If x * w = 1 then choose r w ←$ Z p and compute the key component
If x * w = 0 (in which case d w,1 = z w ), we choose η w ←$ Z p , implicitly set r w := c n+1 + η w and compute
OR gate: If GateType(w) = OR, we let j = depth(w) and again distinguish two cases. If f w (x * ) = 1, choose a w , b w , r w ←$ Z p and set K w as specified by Constrain:
(Even when r A(w) = c n+1 · · · c n+j−1 + η A(w) , one can compute (g j−1 ) r A(w) using the pairings.)
If f w (x * ) = 0, B chooses ψ w , φ w , η w ←$ Z p and implicitly sets a w := c n+j + ψ w , b w := c n+j + φ w and r w := c n+1 · · · c n+j + η w . Since f w (x * ) = 0 implies f A(w) (x * ) = f B(w) (x * ) = 0, we have r A(w) = c n+1 · · · c n+j−1 + η A(w) and r B(w) = c n+1 · · · c n+j−1 + η B(w) . This enables B to create the key components as follows:
(Again, B can compute K w,3 and K w,4 by computing (g j−1 ) c n+1 ···c n+j−1 via the pairings.)
AND gate: If GateType(w) = AND, we let j = depth(w) and distinguish two cases. If f w (x * ) = 1 then B chooses a w , b w , r w ←$ Z p and defines K w as specified by Constrain:
Otherwise, choose ψ w , φ w , η w ←$ Z p . Suppose f A(w) (x * ) = 0. Then implicitly set a w := c n+j + ψ w , b w := φ w and r w := c n+1 · · · c n+j + η w . Since we have r A(w) = c n+1 · · · c n+j−1 + η A(w) , and since (g j−1 ) r B(w) is computable via the pairings, B can compute the key components as follows:
If f A(w) (x * ) = 1 then we must have f B(w) (x * ) = 0 and B can compute the key components as above with the roles of a w and b w swapped.
Prove queries. Suppose A queries its Prove oracle on x. If x = x * then B aborts and outputs b ←$ {0, 1}. Otherwise, let j be such that x j = x * j . Repeatedly applying the bilinear maps, B computes (g n−1 ) i∈[n]\{j} d i,x i , and by raising it to
Challenge query. When A queries the challenge oracle for a value different from x * , B aborts and outputs a random bit b ←$ {0, 1}. Otherwise it returns T , which is either 
A Constrained PRFs With Fewer Group Levels
In this appendix we show that the two constrained PRFs based on multilinear groups by Boneh and Waters [BW13] can be defined with fewer levels in the group hierarchy. Constrained PRFs are basically defined like constrained VRFs but without public keys and without the Verify algorithm. Instead of Prove, there is an algorithm Eval which takes a constrained key and an input x and outputs F (k, x). Besides correctness, it is required that a constrained PRF satisfies pseudorandomness, which is defined as for constrained VRFs, but with the Prove oracle replaced by a Eval oracle, which queried on x outputs F (k, x). For the precise definition of constrained PRFs we refer to [BW13] .
A.1 Bit-Fixing PRF
We show that the bit-fixing PRF for inputs of length n from [BW13] can be defined over a sequence of groups G 1 , . . . , G κ with κ := n − 1 rather than κ = n + 1, as in [BW13] . There the function value is defined as
, while removing α from the secret key. We adapt the definition of constrained keys and prove the construction pseudorandom under the (n − 1)-MDDH assumption.
Setup(1 λ , 1 n ): On input the security parameter λ and the input length n, the setup runs G(1 λ , n − 1), which outputs a sequence of groups G = (G 1 , . . . , G n−1 ) of prime order p, with generators g = g 1 , . . . ,
and β ∈ {0, 1}. The PRF master key is k :
The domain and range are defined as X := {0, 1} n and Y := G n−1 . The keyed function F for input x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n is defined as
The algorithm takes as input k and a vector v ∈ {0, 1, ?} n describing the constrained input space as S v := {x ∈ {0, 1} n | ∀i ∈ [n] :
Eval(k v , x): Let V be as above and let V := {i ∈ [n] | v i = ?} be its complement; if x i = v i for some i ∈ V then abort. Using the bilinear maps applied to {D i,x i } i∈V , first compute
The above construction is pseudorandom:
Theorem 3. If there exists a PT adversary A that breaks pseudorandomness of the above n-bit input bit-fixing PRF with advantage (λ) then there exists a PT algorithm B that breaks the (n−1)-Multilinear Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption with advantage 2 −n · (λ).
Proof. We assume that when x * is A's (one-time) challenge query then A never queries constrained keys that could evaluate x * , nor its Eval oracle on x * . We construct B, which receives an (n − 1)-MDDH challenge consisting of a group-sequence description G and elements g = g 1 , g c 1 , . . . , g cn and T , which is either (g n−1 ) i∈[n] c j or a random element from G n−1 . B picks x * ←$ {0, 1} n , which it hopes will be A's challenge query, and z 1 , . . . , z n ←$ Z p and sets
and β ∈ {0, 1}. Observe that this is distributed as in the real scheme.
Constrain queries. Suppose A queries a secret key for v ∈ {0, 1, ?} n . Let V := {i ∈ [n] | v i = ?} be the set of fixed indices. B chooses an arbitrary j ∈ V such that v j = x * j . If no such j exists then the key could be used to evaluate F (k, x * ), in which case B aborts outputting a random guess b ←$ {0, 1}. If |V | = 1 then V = {j}, thus B knows z j with D j,v j = g z j and sets k v := z j . If |V | > 1, then by repeatedly applying the bilinear maps to the values {D i,v i } i∈V \{j} , it computes (g |V |−1 ) i∈V \{j} d i,v i and raises this value to z j = d j,v j to compute k v := (g |V |−1 ) i∈V d i,v i . B answers the query with
Evaluate queries. Since F (k, x) is identical to a key for v = x, this value can be computed as for the constrained-key query above.
Challenge query. If A's (one-time) challenge query is different from x * then B outputs a guess b ←$ {0, 1}. Otherwise, replies with
When A outputs a guess b then B, if it has not aborted, outputs the same guess b . Success probability. The probability that B wins the MDDH game is analyzed as for the bit-fixing VRF. Let abort denote the event that B aborts during the simulation. Since B aborts if and only if A queries its Challenge oracle on a value different from x * , we have Pr 
A.2 Constrained PRF for Circuit Predicates
The construction is almost identical to the one by Boneh and Waters [BW13] , except that we set κ := n + − 1 rather than κ := n + , where n is the input length and the maximum depth of the circuits. In the Constrain algorithm, we then define the key elements for input wires as elements from G 1 rather than G 2 and key elements for gates of depth j will contain values from G j−1 rather than G j . Moreover, the values E w computed by Eval for a gate w of depth j will be in G j+n−1 rather than G j+n ; in particular the value of the output gate (which is F (k, x)) is in G n+ −1 instead of G n+ . Setup(1 λ , 1 n , 1 ): On input the security parameter, the bit length n and the maximum circuit depth do the following: Run G(1 λ , κ) with κ := n + − 1 to compute a sequence of groups G = (G 1 , . . . , G κ ) of prime order p, with generators g 1 , . . . , g κ , and let g = g 1 . Choose random exponents α ←$ Z p and
and β ∈ {0, 1}. The key is defined as
The domain is X = {0, 1} n and the range is Y = G κ . On input x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X , the function value is defined as
Constrain(k, f = (n, q, A, B, GateType)): On input the key and a circuit description f with n input wires, q gates (and thus n + q wires), with the wire n + q designated as output wire, Constrain first chooses r 1 , . . . , r n+q−1 ←$ Z p and sets r n+q := α. For every wire w, generate a key component K w , whose structure depends on the type of the wire: input wire, OR gate, or AND gate.
Evaluate queries. Suppose A queries Eval on x. If x = x * then B aborts and outputs b ←$ {0, 1}. Otherwise, let j be such that x j = x * j . Repeatedly applying the pairings, B computes g c n+1 ···c n+ = g α =: A, as well as (g n−1 ) i∈[n]\{j} d i,x i , and by raising it to
Challenge query. When A queries the challenge oracle for a value different from x * , B aborts and outputs b ←$ {0, 1}. Otherwise, it returns T , which is either (g n+ −1 ) i∈[n+ ] c i = (g n+ −1 ) Garg, Gentry and Halevi [GGH13a] define an "approximate" version of multilinear groups, which they call graded encoding systems. Roughly speaking, to an element of a multilinear group, such as g α i corresponds a set S (α) i of bit strings in a graded encoding system. These encodings permit additive homomorphisms (corresponding to the group operation in G i ) and a bounded multiplicative homomorphism (corresponding to the multilinear map e).
Formally, a κ-graded encoding system consists of a ring R and a system of sets S = {S (α) i ⊂ {0, 1} * | i ∈ [κ], α ∈ R}, such that for every i ∈ [κ] and every distinct α 1 , α 2 ∈ R, the sets S i , which corresponds to the group G i . We require that there exist the following efficient procedures:
Instance generation: On input the security parameter and the number of levels κ, InstGen(1 λ , 1 κ ) outputs parameters params, which describe a κ-graded encoding system and p zt , the zero-test element for level κ. The value params will be an implicit input to all of the following procedures.
Ring sampler: samp() outputs a level-0 encoding a ∈ S (α) 0
for a uniformly random α ←$ R.
Encoding: enc(i, a) takes a level i ∈ [κ] and a level-0 encoding a ∈ S (α) 0
for some α ∈ R, and outputs a level-i encoding u ∈ S (α) i for the same α.
B.2 The Bit-Fixing VRF Implemented With Graded Encoding Systems
Construction. Boneh and Waters [BW13] show that their multilinear-group based constrained PRF can be transformed to the setting of graded encoding system. Here, we show that our bit-fixing VRF can also be implemented in graded encoding systems, and note that the transformation of our circuit-constrained VRF works analogously. A scheme that includes a verification procedure (as for VRFs) which is first defined using the abstraction of multilinear groups and then tranformed to graded encodings, is the construction of identity-based aggregate signatures by Hohenberger, Sahai and Waters [HSW13a] . Our graded-encodings-based bit-fixing VRF is defined as follows:
Setup(1 λ , 1 n ): On input λ and the input length n, Setup runs InstGen(1 λ , 1 n ) to generate parameters (params, p zt ) for the graded encoding system. params includes a level-1 encoding of 1 ∈ R, which we denote as g. Next, run samp() 2n + 1 times to generate level-0 encodings c and d i,β of random elements γ, δ i,β ←$ R, for i ∈ [n], β ∈ {0, 1}. Define C ←$ enc(1, c) and D i,β ←$ enc(1, d i,β ) for i ∈ [n], β ∈ {0, 1}. The VRF public and secret key are defined as pk := params, p zt , C, {D i,β } i∈[n], β∈{0,1}
sk := pk, c, {d i,β } i∈[n], β∈{0,1}
The domain is X = {0, 1} n , the range of the function is Y = {0, 1} (λ) (with defined as the output length of the extraction algorithm ext), and proofs are in S n−1 . The function value and proof computation for input x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n are defined as
where the product is defined as repeated application of the multiplication algorithm mul to level-0 encodings, as in Equation (2).
Verify(pk, x, y, π): To verify a tuple (x, y, π) ∈ {0, 1} n ×{0, 1} (λ) ×S n−1 w.r.t. a public key pk as in (3), compute D(x), a level-n encoding of i∈[n] δ i,x i , by multiplying the public-key elements {D i,x i } i∈[n] :
D(x) ←$ mul n − 1, . . . , mul 2, mul(1, D 1,x 1 , 1, D 2,x 2 ), 1, D 3,x 3 , . . . , 1, D n,xn ∈ S ( i∈[n] δ i,x i ) n First, we check whether the purported proof π is a level-(n−1) encoding of i∈[n] δ i,x i , that is, whether π ∈ (S n−1 ) ( i∈[n] δ i,x i ) . We can do this by multiplying π with g (the level-1 encoding of 1 contained in params), which for correct proofs yields an element of S n ( i∈[n] δ i,x i ) . Subtracting D(x), which is an element of this set, should then yield and encoding of 0, which can be verified using the zero-test for level-n elements. It then remains to check whether y is the canonical representative of γ · i∈[n] δ i,x i ∈ R, which can be done by multiplying C and π, which yields an element of S n (γ· i∈[n] δ i,x i ) , from which we can extract the canonical representation. Verify thus output 1 if the following equations are satisfied:
isZero add n, mul(1, G, n − 1, π), neg(n, D(x)) = 1 ext p zt , mul(1, C, n − 1, π) = y Constrain(sk, v): Since multiplying a proof P (sk, x) with the public-key element C and extracting the canonical representative yields F (sk, x) (cf. the second verification equation), it suffices that a constrained key lets us construct P (sk, x).
